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A. Introduction 
 
Short selling is a sensitive subject. Setting aside moral concerns about selling 
something one does not own, short sellers provide convenient targets of criticism as 
they are, in a sense, seen as betting against the team: they allow investors to profit 
when the share price falls.
1
 During the 2008 global financial crisis, the price collapse 
of listed financial securities following the demise of Lehman Brothers brought the 
issue of short selling onto the centre stage, and regulators around the world imposed 
temporary short selling bans in an effort to halt the downward spiral in prices. Within 
the EU, short selling then returned to the spotlight during the subsequent sovereign 
debt crisis. In particular, as the Greek government showed signs of financial collapse, 
short sales and credit default swaps (‘CDSs’) on Greek sovereign debt increased, and 
certain Member States blamed short sellers for aggravating Greece’s financial woes. 
More recently, as China’s stock market experienced dramatic declines during 2015 
and early 2016, the Chinese regulators pointed the finger of blame at ‘malicious’ short 
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sellers (amongst others); imposed a variety of short selling restrictions; and instigated 
a number of market manipulation probes. Likewise, the Greek regulators imposed a 
further set of temporary short selling bans during 2015 when Greece again teetered on 
the brink of collapse.  
 
Following the global financial crisis, short selling regulation did not form a key 
priority on the international G20 reform agenda.
2
 Nevertheless in the US, (a 
jurisdiction that had regulated short selling in one form or another since the 1930s), 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the ‘SEC’) subsequently implemented a 
number of new short selling restrictions with respect to equity securities, including re-
introducing a type of short sale price test. In the EU (where many jurisdictions had 
historically never regulated the practice), the Short Selling Regulation (the 
‘Regulation’) was implemented in 2012, largely as a consequence of the sovereign 
debt crisis. Indeed, the influence of the debt crisis is evident in the Regulation’s 
provisions that not only covers the short selling of equity securities, but also restricts 
short selling in the sovereign debt markets.   
 
The Regulation also confers a wide set of supervisory powers on the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’).3 In contrast to the powers granted to 
ESMA’s predecessor, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (‘CESR’), 
ESMA has far-reaching operational powers under the Regulation, including 
facilitation and coordination responsibilities with respect to proposed emergency 
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measures imposed by national competent authorities (‘NCAs’). In addition, ESMA’s 
powers also enable it to directly intervene with respect to short selling in exceptional 
circumstances. ESMA’s new powers considerably extend its authority beyond that 
granted to CESR, and illustrate a major step forward with respect to EU intervention 
in markets.
4
  
 
Today, both the US and EU short selling regimes are now well established and despite 
the turbulence in financial markets observed at the start of 2016, there are some signs 
of improvement with respect to financial stability in advanced economies.
5
 
Nevertheless, the IMF also recently highlighted a ‘triad of policy challenges’ clouding 
the global financial outlook.
6
 Such concerns included risks with respect to emerging 
market vulnerabilities (especially in relation to China); legacy issues from the crises 
(particularly when the possibility of a Greek euro exit flared up again in 2015); plus 
concerns as to worsening market liquidity. Notably, the IMF also observed that the 
EU restrictions on short selling, including on sovereign CDSs, had negatively 
impeded market liquidity,
7
 and it cautiously suggested that the sovereign CDS 
restrictions should be revoked.
8
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With this broader backdrop in mind, the purpose of this article is to analyse the 
regulatory choices that have been made with respect to short sale restrictions in the 
EU and the US.
9
 It should be observed at the outset that although regulatory concerns 
about short selling often focus on the risk that the practice may exacerbate a 
downward drop in prices, leading to disorderly markets, the economic literature 
largely supports the market efficiency and liquidity benefits of short selling, and does 
not generally endorse the view that short selling destabilises prices.
10
 The economic 
research also generally demonstrates that short selling restrictions hinder valuable 
short selling activity and mean that markets will be less efficient.
11
 Further, there is 
also little convincing evidence that short selling constraints in fact support prices and 
prevent price declines.
12
 Indeed the voluminous empirical literature examining the 
temporary short selling bans imposed during the financial crisis also evidences that 
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the temporary constraints did not achieve their aim of stabilising prices and may have 
impeded market quality.
13
  
 
A further justification behind the 2008 temporary short selling bans was the 
heightened risk of market abuse posed by short sellers during periods of market 
turbulence.
14
 For instance, short selling can be potentially used abusively to create 
misleading signals about the real supply or the correct valuation of a security, and it 
can also be used with scaremongering tactics to push the price of a security down.
15
 
The former UK regulator, the FSA, observed that firms engaging in seasoned equity 
offerings (‘SEOs’) may be especially vulnerable to short selling’s negative effects. 
For example, on a rights issue, short sellers could try to push down the share price in 
the market below the rights issue price in order to profit from the strategy, and the 
FSA suggested that when confidence in firms was more fragile, it would be easier for 
short sellers to push the price into a downwards spiral.
16
   
 
Although these are serious regulatory concerns, it should first be observed that any 
abusive shorting behaviour is likely to be already illegal under existing market 
manipulation legislation, and that regulators have a range of options (including 
administrative and criminal sanctions) under such regimes that can be used to combat 
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any such behaviour.
17
 Further, when reflecting on the relevant economic literature, 
(which largely focuses on SEOs), this generally suggests that there is only limited 
evidence as to manipulative short selling behaviour.
 18
 It also broadly suggests that 
imposing short sale constraints could result in adverse consequences. For instance, a 
recent paper by Autore and Gehy found that short sale restrictions could impact 
market efficiency and have unintended consequences on the capital raising process.
19
  
 
In sum, the economic literature largely supports the market efficiency and liquidity 
benefits of short selling, and generally does not endorse the view that short selling 
destabilises prices, or is an abusive practice per se. Nonetheless, despite the absence 
of clear legal or economic grounds justifying regulatory intervention in this area 
(particularly the imposition of short selling restrictions), short sellers have been 
subject to a range of short selling restrictions in the US since the 1930s, and in the EU 
since 2012. 
 
This article adds to the existing literature on short selling regulation through analysing 
the permanent and temporary short selling constraints now in place on both sides of 
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Atlantic. It demonstrates that, although some functional similarities are evident, 
divergences also exist, not least in the absence of restrictions on the short selling of 
sovereign debt in the US. Further, aside from the EU’s regulation of the sovereign 
debt markets, the short selling restrictions in place in the US are in fact more onerous 
than those in the EU. This article suggests that this outcome may be, in part, 
explained by the fact that the SEC is an agency that is ‘at once independent and 
beholden’;20 it has to go ‘cap in hand’ to Congress for its funding on an annual 
basis.
21
 Further, as a regulatory body, the SEC was also considerably weakened by the 
financial crisis. Consequently, in terms of the future direction of its short selling 
policy, it may well have been partly seeking to placate its political critics in order to 
maintain its jurisdiction going forward.
22
 Turning to the EU, although the legislative 
passage of the Regulation was also a highly politicised affair, some of the more 
interventionist proposals could ultimately be watered down during the Regulation’s 
lengthy negotiation process.
23
  
B. What is Short Selling? 
 
Short selling can broadly be defined as the sale of an asset (often securities) not 
owned by the seller in the hope that an identical asset can be bought back later for a 
lower price. The definition varies but the International Organisation of Securities 
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Commissions (‘IOSCO’) takes the view that whether a particular transaction is a short 
selling activity depends on the presence of two factors: (i) a sale of stock that (ii) the 
seller does not own at the point of sale.
24
 Short selling can be divided into two types: 
(i) conventional or ‘covered’ short selling where a security is borrowed or adequate 
arrangements are made to ensure it can be borrowed before the short sale is executed 
and (ii) ‘naked’ or ‘uncovered’ short selling where no prior arrangement has been 
made to cover the short sale.
25
 With naked short selling the investor sells the 
securities before borrowing them or ensuring they can be borrowed and this is 
possible because there is a gap between the agreement to transfer the securities to the 
buyer at a particular price and the actual payment and transfer.  
 
Sovereign Debt and CDSs 
 
The EU rules also regulate the short selling of sovereign debt and sovereign CDSs. 
Broadly, in order to express a negative view on the evolving credit risk of the 
sovereign issuer, market participants can directly short sell a sovereign bond. 
However bonds reflect risk other than credit risk (for instance interest rate risk), and it 
can also be tricky to short sell bonds (especially corporate bonds), as there is no active 
secondary market for a large part of the bonds outstanding.
26
 An equivalent 
mechanism involves purchasing a sovereign CDS. This is an over-the-counter 
(‘OTC’) product and where an investor purchases a CDS without some kind of 
exposure to the credit risk associated with the underlying bond (for instance where the 
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investor does not hold the debt instrument) this is described as having an uncovered 
or naked CDS. Naked CDSs provide a relatively simple mechanism for expressing a 
negative view on credit risk and such purchases do not involve the same required 
outlay as purchasing a bond.  
C. Regulatory Concerns about Short Selling 
 
Three perceived concerns are commonly voiced about short selling: market 
destabilisation; market abuse; and settlement risk.
27
 First, as discussed in section A, 
there is a popular perception that in extreme market conditions short selling can 
trigger an excessive downward spiral in share prices leading to disorderly markets.
28
 
Although such concerns are understandable, it is important to first appreciate that 
short sellers can be viewed as sophisticated investors, akin to analysts, who invest 
considerable time and resources analysing companies.
29
 Indeed, short sellers take 
considerable financial risks when engaging in shorting activity. Although they can 
profit when the share price falls, the price can only ever fall to zero, capping any 
potential gain. In contrast, if the share price rises (and there is no cap on it rising), a 
short seller can be caught in what is known as a ‘short squeeze’ where they can suffer 
severe, indeed potentially unlimited, financial losses.  
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Indeed, this is not merely a theoretical observation. In October 2008, many hedge 
funds held short positions in Volkswagen’s shares on the assumption that the price 
was going to fall.
30
 Porsche however then disclosed that it had raised its stake in 
Volkswagen to 42.6 per cent from below 35 per cent, and that it held cash settled 
options for another 31.5 per cent. This announcement sent Volkswagen’s share price 
skyward.
 31
 Hedge funds were faced with a short squeeze, and this was particularly 
exacerbated by the fact that only six per cent of Volkswagen’s shares were trading 
freely, meaning the pressure on those shares was enormous. Ultimately, the Porsche 
disclosure resulted in huge losses to numerous hedge funds, and although there was 
some schadenfraude in the press about ‘payback’ for the hedge fund ‘locusts’,32 
market, academic, and media reaction all complained about a lack of transparency 
with respect to Porsche’s actions.33 
   
Next, although short sellers seek to push the share price lower, this is precisely their 
role. Specifically, and as observed in section A, the economic literature extensively 
demonstrates that short selling helps promote market efficiency. It provides a means 
by which short sellers who know a security is overvalued can trade on the information 
promoting more efficient pricing.
34
 Short selling also contributes to more efficient 
price discovery: unfavourable price information is likely to adjust quicker in the 
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absence of short selling constraints.
35
 Indeed rather than being a suspect activity, short 
selling confers a ‘positive externality’ on the market, by speeding up the reflection of 
unfavourable information into prices.
36
 Likewise it also increases market efficiency 
through enhancing liquidity and trading opportunities. It raises the number of 
potential sellers in the market and this enhances liquidity by increasing trading 
volumes and reducing transaction costs by decreasing bid-ask spreads.
37
  
 
Consequently, if short selling is prohibited, not all information will be fully reflected 
in share prices. Further, if short sellers are forced out of the market, only optimistic 
investors will influence the price and this could create and fuel a speculative market 
bubble.
38
 Indeed, as highlighted in section A, the voluminous empirical literature on 
short selling restrictions, particularly the studies examining the temporary short 
selling bans imposed during the financial crisis, largely demonstrates that bans do not 
achieve their goal of stabilising share prices or preventing price declines, and that 
they can also compromise market quality.
39
  
 
For instance an influential study by Boehmer et al. examined the US emergency order 
that temporarily banned short sales in nearly 1,000 financial stocks in September 
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2008.
40
 The authors observed a large price increase for banned securities on its 
announcement followed by gradual decreases in price during the ban.
41
 It was 
recognised that the price increase around the ban’s announcement could have been 
affected by associated announcement as to the US government’s bank rescue package 
(the ‘Troubled Asset Relief Program’). The authors found that all but the smallest 
securities subject to the ban suffered a serious degradation in market quality and 
concluded that ‘given the evidence, it is not at all clear that the SEC achieved its 
unstated goal of artificially raising prices on financial stocks, and it is clear that 
market quality was severely compromised’.42  
 
Next, although there are real and serious concerns that exist as to manipulative 
behaviour, and although short selling can be used abusively, the practice is not 
abusive per se. Additionally, and as observed in section A, most jurisdictions have 
comprehensive market abuse regimes in place that should be sufficient to address this 
concern, if used effectively. Although such rules generally take the form of ‘ex post’ 
liability rules, imposing additional ‘ex ante’ short selling restrictions would restrict 
legitimate short selling activity and would also have a negative impact on pricing 
efficiency and liquidity. Further, given that long positions (the more conventional 
method of purchasing securities with the intention of selling them for a profit) also 
raise issues of market manipulation, the correct regulatory response should be to 
target all manipulative behaviour occurring rather than singling out short sales.  
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Finally, settlement concerns arise because of the need for settlement periods. 
Specifically, given the nature of securities, a type of settlement period is necessary as 
purchasers and sellers are not present in the market to exchange cash and shares. 
Where short sellers fail to deliver shares that they have sold in time for settlement this 
can cause settlement disruption, which can impair the orderly functioning of 
markets.
43
 Despite this being a serious issue, it is not necessary to restrict short selling 
to tackle it. A combination of strict settlement periods plus the mandating of heavy 
penalties for failures to settle would reduce or eliminate incentives not to settle.
44
 
 
In popular sentiment the concerns highlighted here about short sales particularly 
manifest themselves about naked short selling as it can be conducted more 
aggressively than the conventional practice.
45
 Consequently regulators (including in 
the EU and US) often impose a distinct and more onerous regime for naked short 
sales than for conventional short sales.
46
 Despite such concerns however, naked short 
selling does not lend itself to stronger justifications for regulation; in terms of 
economic implications it is not a special case compared with conventional short 
selling.
47
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First, although settlement disruption is more likely with naked than conventional short 
sales, clearing agencies generally have systems in place to tackle any such delays. 
Similarly, any abusive naked shorting behaviour is likely to already be prohibited 
under existing market manipulation legislation. Next, turning to its benefits, in line 
with covered short selling, naked short selling contributes to market efficiency. 
Indeed, naked short selling can in particular be employed by market makers and other 
liquidity providers to quickly and efficiently fill orders, and can provide liquidity 
when it is otherwise scarce.
48
  
 
In light of this discussion, it is clear that the real rationale behind the crisis-era short 
selling temporary bans (both naked and covered) stemmed especially from the 
pressure faced by securities’ regulators during the crisis. Specifically, the authorities 
utilised short selling restrictions as a technique for trying to ensure financial stability 
(especially with respect to financial institutions).
49
 Further, it was also clear that, as 
Enriques observes, doing nothing was not an option; the sense of panic required 
everyone to be seen to be acting to prevent it, and it would have been very 
embarrassing for the regulators to admit there was nothing they could do to avoid a 
meltdown.
50
 Indeed, such explanations also hold true when one reflects on the recent 
actions taken by the Chinese and the Greek regulators. Temporary short selling 
restrictions were imposed as a means to try and restore financial stability: the 
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constraints could be swiftly introduced; they were easy to sell to the public; and they 
demonstrated the regulators were taking action to try and control the situation.
51
 
 
D. Permanent Short Sale Restrictions 
 
Generally speaking, when there is a perceived need for regulation, there are a number 
of tools that can be used with respect to short selling: permanent and temporary 
restrictions; reporting requirements; and settlement rules. All such tools are now 
utilised in the EU’s and the US’s regulatory regimes to a greater or lesser extent, 
although at the heart of both regimes is a range of short selling restrictions. This 
section examines the EU and US permanent restrictions on short selling. It illustrates 
that functional similarities exist as both jurisdictions have imposed a de facto 
permanent ban on naked short sales. Clear divergences are also evident however. In 
particular, the EU has gone further than the US in also permanently restricting the 
short selling of sovereign debt and prohibiting the use of naked sovereign CDSs to 
effect a short position.  
 
1. The EU 
 
(a) Introduction 
It often takes a financial crisis or a scandal to trigger regulatory change,
52
 and in the 
EU, the financial and sovereign debt crises heralded in an enormous swathe of 
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 16 
reforms characterised by greater harmonisation; further centralisation of powers at the 
European level and an expansion of the regulatory perimeter. In particular the early 
post-crisis European reform agenda was primarily focused on ensuring financial 
stability and the opportunity was also taken with many of the early reforms to regulate 
actors and practices perceived to be a threat to financial stability, including regulating 
short selling.
53
  
 
Although short selling came into the limelight during the financial crisis, short selling 
regulation did not then form a key component of the G20’s post-crisis reform 
agenda.
54
 Nevertheless at the EU level, CESR started to investigate further 
convergence with respect to short selling, launching a review of policy in July 2009 
with a view to formulating pan-European standards on short selling.
55
 Additionally, 
following the implementation of various unilateral and uncoordinated short selling 
bans during the financial crisis, there were calls from the Council in early 2009 to 
enhance greater convergence between Member States with respect to short selling 
measures.
56
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The issue of short selling then became subsequently entwined in the negotiations 
surrounding the contentious Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(‘AIFMD’). 57  Specifically, during the financial crisis, a negative association had 
emerged between hedge fund activity and short selling. This was especially due to the 
shorting activity of hedge funds that was popularly perceived to have amplified the 
severe price falls. Consequently, in terms of the subsequent AIFMD negotiations, the 
Parliament in particular took a very hostile view of naked short selling, proposing that 
it be banned throughout the EU.
58
 
 
The onset of the European sovereign debt crisis then reignited political concerns 
about short selling. In particular, the German and French Governments accused 
speculators of using naked sovereign CDSs to exacerbate the fiscal problems of many 
euro-area countries through raising governments’ borrowing costs. President Sarkozy 
and Chancellor Merkel wrote to the Commission on more than one occasion 
questioning the impact of speculative naked sovereign CDSs on bond yields, and 
proposing legislative measures banning such practices.
59
 In May 2010, Germany also 
then shocked the markets with its unilateral prohibition on the naked short selling of 
sovereign debt and sovereign CDS on euro-area government bonds.
60
 
 
                                                 
57
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Despite the Franco-German concerns however, there was little concrete evidence to 
substantiate their allegations. In particular, a report by the Commission’s own Task 
Force found there was no conclusive evidence that developments in the sovereign 
CDS market had led to higher funding costs for Member States.
61
 Likewise, research 
undertaken by the IMF concluded that, overall, the evidence did not support the need 
to ban purchases of naked sovereign CDSs.
62
  
 
In addition, given that it was countries such as Greece and Portugal whose sovereign 
bond markets were most affected by any alleged speculation, one might have 
expected it to be them, rather than France and Germany to be arguing most ardently 
for the imposition of short selling restrictions. With this in mind, the Franco-German 
actions were perhaps suggestive of politicians’ attempts to utilise the debt crisis to 
further their own interests.
63
 For instance, French presidential and German state 
elections were on the horizon and taking a hard stance on speculative short sellers was 
likely to prove popular with the voters, whilst also deflecting blame from the 
politicians’ own shortcomings.64   
 
More broadly, it is also notable that the Franco-German practice of sending out joint 
communications with shared priorities also extended beyond short selling regulation 
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to wider areas of reform.
65
 For instance, in May 2010 the Franco-German leaders 
wrote to Commission President Barroso attacking the credit rating agencies for their 
role in the sovereign debt crisis and calling for tough measures to be taken to curb 
their influence in the markets.
66
 With this in mind, it has been suggested that such 
practices provided evidence of the emergence of a more intrusive regulatory style that 
reflected Franco-German choices.
67
 Although in the pre-crisis era the British ‘light 
touch’ and ‘disclosure focused’ policymakers had been especially influential at the 
European level, this had been discredited since the start of the crisis, paving the way 
for the rise of a new pecking order within the EU.
68
 This involved a more stability-
orientated approach to regulation that included the use of trading bans as a regulatory 
tool; an approach associated especially with France, and Italy, and, to a lesser extent, 
with Germany.
69
 
 
In this very tense political atmosphere, the Commission produced a short selling 
proposal (along with its European Market Infrastructure Regulation proposal 
(‘EMIR’) with respect to regulating OTC derivatives) in September 2010.70 The short 
selling proposal was less interventionist than the final set of rules, and the proposal 
was subject to a series of highly charged and drawn-out negotiations.
71
 In particular, 
along with the Franco-German demands, the Parliament was especially vocal in 
pushing for a ban on naked short selling, including in relation to naked sovereign 
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CDSs (although the Parliament was also softer in its approach in some respects, 
including, for instance, with respect to the notion of a covered sovereign CDS 
trade).
72
  
 
The outcome of the negotiations was a Regulation that contained one set of 
restrictions on the naked short selling of shares, and another lesser set of constraints 
on the naked short selling of sovereign debt. There was no economic justification 
behind the distinction in treatment of shares and sovereign debt: only political 
sensitivities with respect to Member States’ sovereign debt markets explained the 
differentiation. In addition, particularly reflecting the Parliament’s input (in 
conjunction with the input of a number of Member States), an effective ban was also 
imposed on naked sovereign CDSs (although the Parliament eventually had to 
concede to an opt-out provision).
73
 The Regulation’s politicisation was also further 
evidenced in the absence of regulation on the short selling of corporate bonds.
74
  
(b) Overview of the Regulation 
To provide a brief overview of the EU rules, the Regulation’s scope is widely drawn; 
domicile or establishment is irrelevant, and the territorial scope is defined by the 
nature of the instrument traded not a person’s location.75 Consequently the rules have 
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extra-territorial scope when short-selling activities relate to ‘in-scope’ instruments.76 
However despite its wide ambit, the restrictions are then largely directed at shares, 
sovereign debt, and uncovered sovereign CDSs.
77
 Strict settlement rules are also 
imposed,
78
 and, accompanying the restrictions, are a set of reporting requirements in 
relation to net short positions.
79
 Private and public reporting is required of short sales 
of shares, although only private notifications are required of sovereign debt. Further, 
in exceptional circumstances a wide set of temporary intervention measures can be 
imposed by NCAs, and, potentially, also by ESMA.
80
   
 
There are a number of supervisory and enforcement mechanisms under the Regulation 
that include NCA supervisory and investigatory powers; wide powers are also 
conferred on ESMA that range from it performing a facilitation and coordination role 
with respect to NCA emergency measures, to ESMA’s own direct intervention 
powers.
81
 In terms of ex post sanctions, the Regulation’s provisions largely reflect the 
pre-crisis ‘less articulated’ approach to enforcement.82 Penalties for infringements are 
not harmonised and it is up to the Member State to establish rules on the measures 
applicable.
83
 However on an annual basis, Member States are required to provide 
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ESMA with aggregate information regarding penalties and administrative measures 
imposed.
84
  
 
Overall, the NCAs and ESMA should be able to encourage compliance with the 
Regulation through a range of strategies including ex ante supervision, monitoring 
and voluntary compliance techniques, to more punitive enforcement mechanisms in 
the event of a firm’s non-compliance (a ‘pyramid of sanctions’).85 Further, although 
the penalties for infringements are not harmonised in the Regulation, change can now 
be observed more broadly with the related European market abuse reforms that take 
effect in July 2016. The new rules adopt a more prescriptive approach to penalties, 
including providing minimum standards with respect to sanctions for specific 
breaches of the revised market abuse rules.
86
 Consequently, it may become easier 
going forward to impose harmonised sanctions under the linked market abuse 
legislation. 
 
(c) Permanent Restrictions: Uncovered Short Selling of Shares 
Examining the Regulation’s permanent restrictions, the core provisions are geared 
towards the short sale of securities, sovereign debt, and sovereign CDSs.
87
 The 
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Regulation draws a fundamental distinction between naked and covered short selling, 
and while naked short selling is subject to a strict set of constraints, a lighter set of 
rules (predominantly based around reporting requirements) apply to covered short 
sales. The permanent restrictions apply to the naked short selling of shares but notably 
they do not extend to ‘synthetic’ short sales, such as through the use of derivatives. It 
is likely that options and other synthetic strategies were not included in the main 
restrictions due to the fact that the public found short selling morally reprehensible 
but did not understand the use of more complex strategies such as put and call 
options. 
 
Article 12 distinguishes between covered and naked short sales and provides that a 
natural or legal person (‘person’) may enter into a short sale of shares admitted to a 
trading venue in the EU when it is regarded as covered. This requires one of three 
conditions to be met. First, a short sale is covered if the shares have been borrowed or 
alternative provision has been made to the same effect.
88
 Alternatively, it is regarded 
as covered if a person has entered into an agreement to borrow the share or has 
another ‘absolutely enforceable claim’ under contract or property law to be 
transferred ownership of a corresponding number of securities of the same class so 
settlement can be effected when due.
89
 The Implementing Regulation elaborates on 
the type of agreements contemplated, including futures and swaps contracts, options 
and repurchase agreements.
90
 Securities lending and prime brokerage arrangements 
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are also capable of being employed but only if they are specific as to the number of 
shares being sold short and specify a delivery date.
91
  
 
Finally, a short sale is covered if it satisfies the ‘locate’ requirement. This rule was 
much fought over during the Regulation’s negotiations and was eventually watered 
down from a ‘hard locate and reserve’ requirement as part of the trade-off for the 
Parliament obtaining its ban on naked sovereign CDSs. However although this 
concession was important politically, the amended rules still largely amount to a de 
facto ban on naked short selling. Specifically, the Regulation’s locate rule requires 
that a person has an arrangement with a third party under which the third party has 
confirmed the share has been located, and has taken ‘measures’ vis-à-vis third parties 
necessary for the person to have a ‘reasonable expectation’ that settlement can be 
effected when due.
92
 The locate requirement is necessary in all cases before a short 
sale is undertaken and relates to the third party’s confirmation that it can make the 
shares available for settlement in due time taking account of the amount of the 
possible sale and market conditions, and indicates the periods for which the shares are 
located.  
 
The administrative rules then provide for three different confirmations and measures: 
a standard requirement, and lighter requirements imposed on intraday short sales, and 
liquid short sales.
93
 Broadly, for liquid short sales, and intraday short sales, an 
additional confirmation is required prior to the short sale being entered into that the 
share is easy to borrow or purchase in the relevant quantity, taking account of the 
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market conditions and other information available to the third party.
94
 ESMA has also 
confirmed that it is not possible to rely on or refer to easy to borrow lists; a precise 
confirmation is required.
95
 If such prior confirmations can be obtained, then the 
requested number of shares need not also be put on hold for that person.
96
 For all 
other ‘standard’ arrangements, the third party is required to confirm, prior to the short 
sale being entered into, that it has at least put on hold the requested number of shares 
for that person.
97
 Finally, the third party with whom the arrangements are made must 
be a distinct legal entity from the short seller.
98
  
 
The EU provisions significantly constrain the practice of short selling. First, rather 
than, for instance, limiting their application to those situations where naked short 
selling could potentially give rise to the greatest likelihood of abuse; the restrictions 
apply to all shares within the Regulation’s ambit, all of the time. Second, the 
restrictions are particularly onerous due the restrictive interpretation taken to the 
related administrative rules. For instance, commonly used master lending agreements 
will be incapable of satisfying the requirements unless they contain a specific 
confirmation covering specific securities and specifying a delivery date for each short 
sale. Next, the ‘standard’ locate confirmation and measures constitute a clear ban on 
naked short selling due to the put on hold requirement. Further, the rules on intraday 
and liquid short sales also amount to serious constraints. Short sellers cannot rely on 
                                                 
94
 Ibid art 6(3) and (4). Other confirmations are also specified including (for intraday purchases) a 
request for confirmation from the short seller to the broker that the short sale will be covered by 
purchases during the day; and undertakings by the short seller to monitor the amount of the short sale 
not covered by purchases. 
95
 ESMA (n 75) 25. 
96
 ESMA, ‘Draft Technical Standards on the EU Short Selling Regulation: Final Report’ (March 2012) 
6. 
97
 Implementing Regulation 827/2012, art 6(2). 
98
 Ibid art 8. Note that there are also limited exemptions from the restrictions for market-makers, 
Regulation 236/2012, art 17. 
 26 
easy to borrow lists and must obtain an actual confirmation from a broker before 
entering into the short sale that the share is easy to borrow in the relevant quantity 
taking account of market conditions. There are also additional confirmations and 
undertakings that have been described as ‘superfluous and counterproductive’.99 
 
A 2013 evaluation of the regulation by ESMA (the ‘Evaluation’) also helps shed light 
on the rules’ operation in practice. Although a degree of caution must be taken with 
the findings given the short time scale between the Regulation’s introduction and its 
publication, ESMA’s findings largely suggest that the restrictions have adversely 
affected the price discovery process and that the rules have negatively impacted 
activity in the securities lending market.
100
  
 
Ultimately, it is the precise parameters of the locate arrangements and measures that 
determine how close a set of rules come to constituting an absolute ban on naked 
short selling.
101
 Specifically, due to the narrow interpretation of the permissible 
borrowing and locate arrangements, the European rules effectively amount to a de 
facto ban on naked short selling. Although watering down the ‘hard locate’ 
requirement during the negotiations was important politically, it has not resulted in a 
meaningful change. 
 
(d) Settlement Discipline 
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Linked to the restrictions, are the settlement discipline rules whose function is to 
tackle the risk of settlement failure that arises particularly from naked short selling. 
These rules will only be touched on briefly as they are in the process of being 
replaced by the European Regulation on securities settlement and central securities 
depositories (the ‘CSD Regulation’).102  
 
The Regulation sets out basic standards of settlement discipline through a 
combination of buy-in procedures and fines for failed settlement of transactions in 
shares.
103
 The rules’ ambit is limited however; they only cover shares cleared by 
central counterparties (‘CCPs’) so the rules do not extend to OTC or exchange 
transactions not cleared by CCPs. Further, the rules do not harmonise the length of the 
settlement periods throughout the EU and the settlement penalties are not harmonised, 
creating a risk of arbitrage.
104
 
 
Settlement discipline requirements are now tackled through the CSD Regulation. The 
CSD Regulation aligns the settlement periods for transactions in transferable 
securities (broadly shares and bonds) executed on trading venues to T+2. It also 
introduces mandatory buy-in periods where there are fails-to-deliver (‘FTDs’) within 
four business days after the intended settlement date.
105
 If buy-in is not possible, a 
party can choose to be compensated in cash or can defer execution until a later date. 
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The CSDs must also establish procedures providing for penalties calculated on a daily 
basis, including cash penalties, to serve as a deterrent.
106
  
 
The new rules are a welcome development and should help improve levels of 
settlement discipline within the EU going forward. They are also a sensible means of 
tackling concerns in relation to short selling and settlement disruption and should 
eliminate or reduce any incentive to fail to settle a trade. Nevertheless, many of the 
technical nuts and bolts of the CSD Regulation are still in the process of being 
finalised, and the settlement discipline measures and the related repeal of the short 
selling settlement rules will only apply from the entry into force of the related 
administrative rules on settlement discipline (currently anticipated for 2018).
107
  
 
(e) Permanent Restrictions: Sovereign Debt Markets 
Sovereign Debt 
 
At a broad level, similar constraints to those imposed on shares dictate whether a 
short sale of sovereign debt is ‘covered’ and thereby permitted by the rules. 108 
Notably however, due to the political sensitivities surrounding possible damage to 
countries’ sovereign debt markets, the sovereign debt restrictions are less onerous 
than those imposed on securities. For example, in contrast to the locate rule for shares 
that can require a put on hold confirmation, no such requirement is included for 
                                                 
106
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sovereign debt.
109
 The constraints also do not apply where the transaction serves to 
hedge a long position in an issuer’s debt instruments, the pricing of which has a ‘high 
correlation’ with the pricing of the sovereign debt.110 This means a correlation of 80 
per cent. Again, due to political concerns that the restrictions could affect the 
management of countries’ budget deficits,111 an opt-out was agreed; the restrictions 
can be temporarily suspended by the NCA where the liquidity of the sovereign debt 
drops below a specified level.
112
  
 
Sovereign CDSs 
 
With respect to the rules governing uncovered sovereign CDSs, these provisions were 
particularly controversial during the Regulation’s negotiations. The final rules are 
complex, reflecting the Parliament’s push to ban such instruments, yet also trying to 
ensure that legitimate hedging activity continues to be permissible. The Regulation 
provides that a person may enter into an uncovered position in a sovereign CDS only 
where this does not lead to an uncovered position in a sovereign CDS.
113
 The 
provisions specify that whether the transaction is uncovered depend on whether it is a 
permitted hedge.
114
 There are two forms of permissible hedging. First, hedging is 
permitted against the risk of default of the issuer where the person has a long position 
in the sovereign debt of the issuer to which the sovereign CDS relates. Second, 
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‘proxy’ hedging is permitted against the risk of a decline of the value of the sovereign 
debt where the person holds assets or is subject to liabilities (including, but not 
limited to financial contracts, a portfolio of assets, or financial obligations) the value 
of which is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt.
115
  
 
Due to the challenge of distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate hedging, the related 
administrative provisions set out a complex regime that must be complied with to 
constitute a permissible hedge.
116
 A broad range of exposures can be hedged, but 
cross-border hedging is not generally permissible.
117
 Although there were 
considerable differences of view when the administrative provisions were being 
drafted as to whether cross-border hedging should be permissible, a member of 
ESMA’s board of supervisors was quoted as saying that it had received a very strong 
position that cross-border hedging was not exempt.
118
 This outcome can be 
questioned however; there may be several legitimate reasons for hedging a risk in one 
Member State with a sovereign CDS related to a reference entity in another Member 
State (including where, for instance, cheaper proxies exist).
119
 Further, such 
restrictions may also contradict core principles behind the EU’s single market and 
could provide disincentives in relation to cross-border business.  
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Next, correlation is also a key test to eligibility, and alternative quantitative or 
qualitative tests are set out in the administrative rules. Broadly, the quantitative test is 
met where there is a correlation coefficient of at least 70 per cent between the price of 
the assets or liabilities being hedged and the price of the sovereign debt. This is 
calculated on a historical basis for at least 12 months of trading days preceding when 
the CDS position was taken out. The qualitative test shall be met showing a 
‘meaningful’ correlation based on ‘appropriate’ data. This should again be calculated 
on a historical basis but an alternative time frame can be used if it would reflect 
similar conditions to those at the time the CDS position was taken out.
120
 Finally, 
there is also a proportionality requirement: the size of the sovereign CDS position 
must be proportionate to the size of the exposure being hedged.
121
 
 
Although the quantitative test is precise, the requirement that the calculation be made 
on a historical basis fails to take into account that correlation may change over time or 
may not yet exist with respect to situations of legitimate hedging of future risks.
122
 
Likewise, it is also unclear what will be sufficient to satisfy the qualitative test. 
Although this has likely been included to ensure parties can capture a broader range 
of assets, it could prove risky to rely on in practice. For instance, where a party is 
required to justify to the regulator that the test has been met, the ban could be 
breached if they cannot demonstrate that the data they relied on was appropriate.
123
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Due to uncertainties surrounding the provisions’ application, parties will likely avoid 
using sovereign CDSs and shift to other mechanisms, and this has been borne out in 
practice.
124
  From August 2011 onwards, volumes of net notional CDSs started to 
sharply decline and this could have been in part due to positions being unwound in 
advance of the Regulation’s introduction.125 Some parties indicated positions were 
being unwound, as it was feared the hedging rules were so vague that they would be 
viewed as speculating even if they were not.
126
 There has also been a sharp decline in 
volumes traded on the European sovereign CDS indices (CDS contracts on a basket of 
reference entities are known as ‘index and tranche CDS’ and combine reference 
entities with a theme in common).
127
 In addition, since the Regulation came into 
force, volumes traded on the main European sovereign CDS index have declined 100 
per cent (i.e. the index has essentially been shut down).
128
  
 
Finally, the EU rules also provide for an opt-out in the event that the CDS restrictions 
increase the cost of borrowing.
129
 There is a paradox here as it is precisely at the time 
when the opt-out powers can be exercised that regulators may be restricting other 
forms of short selling.
130
 As with the ability to suspend the sovereign debt restrictions, 
this opt-out provision was the product of political compromise during the 
negotiations. Indeed, it serves to reiterate that the political reality of the rule-making 
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process can lead to ambiguities and internal inconsistencies within the legislation 
itself. In this instance, most of the countries that opposed the Parliament’s sovereign 
CDS restrictions, eventually agreed after this provision was included.
131
  
 
 
2. The US: Permanent Restrictions on Short Sales of Shares 
 
(a) Introduction 
In contrast to the EU, the US did not introduce short selling restrictions in the 
sovereign debt market. In particular, as Moloney observes, although there was some 
initial discussion about an international G20 response to CDS trading, including in 
relation to the sovereign debt markets, the international reform agenda then shifted 
away from short selling regulation and become more focused on the regulation of 
OTC derivatives and related clearing obligations.
132
   
 
Nevertheless, in the light of the financial crisis, the SEC subsequently introduced a 
number of additional short selling constraints with respect to equity securities, and a 
variety of different provisions now restrict short selling in the US. As this section will 
illustrate, the naked short selling rules in place in the US are functionally equivalent 
to those in the EU, and amount to a de facto ban on naked short selling. However, the 
                                                 
131
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US has also gone further than the EU in imposing restrictions on both covered and 
naked short selling in advance of seasoned equity offerings (‘SEO’).133  
 
Additionally, as with the EU’s rules, the broader political context has also had a 
significant impact on the SEC’s short selling policy. First, as observed in section A, 
although the SEC is an independent regulatory agency, it is also a political body.
134
 It 
is the President who appoints the SEC Commissioners and its Chairman; and it is the 
President and Congress who set the SEC’s annual budget. 135  Indeed, Congress 
maintains increasingly tight control over SEC policy, especially through the means of 
the budgetary process.
136
  
 
Further, the SEC also became weakened as a regulatory agency during the financial 
crisis. Specifically, it became the subject of much criticism as to its performance, 
including with respect to its failures in relation to the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme 
fraud,
137
 and for its lack of supervision of the investment banks, most of which 
suffered turmoil during the crisis.
138
 The SEC also came under huge pressure from the 
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Treasury and the Federal Reserve, including with respect to the imposition of 
temporary short selling bans during the crisis, and a number of Congressmen also 
started demanding that the SEC carry out investigations into short selling practices.
139
 
Consequently, when reflecting on the approach the SEC took to its short selling 
policy post-crisis, it may well have been influenced by the need to try and placate its 
political critics, especially those who provided its funding in order to maintain its 
jurisdiction going forward.
140
  
 
In this regard however, it is also important to appreciate that this is only part of a 
more complex story. Specifically, the primary aims of the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury include the more short-term goals of maintaining the financial system’s 
stability and containing systemic risk.
141
 In contrast, the SEC’s main objectives are 
more related to ensuring the efficiency and liquidity of financial markets and the 
efficient allocation of resources.
142
 Given that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
are more powerful governmental actors than the SEC, it is evident that in a time of 
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crisis, the concrete aim of short-term stability would carry far more weight than the 
longer-term and more nuanced objective of market efficiency.
143
 
 
(b) Permanent Restrictions on All Short Sales 
The short selling restrictions now in place go beyond the EU’s regime as the US rules 
also impose constraints on all short sales before a SEO.
144
 The current incarnation of 
the SEO rules provide that persons who opened a short position five days before the 
offer date are prohibited from purchasing shares in the offer, regardless of whether the 
shares would be used to cover the short sale. As observed in section A, broadly the 
economic literature suggests that there is only limited evidence as to manipulative 
shorting behaviour, and the scholarship also suggests that imposing short sale 
constraints could result in adverse consequences.
145
  
 
As observed in Section C, there are real and serious concerns that exist about 
manipulative behaviour, and this includes short selling behaviour in advance of SEOs. 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the imposition of ex ante short selling restrictions will 
impede pricing efficiency, and can also restrict legitimate short selling activity. In 
addition, a number of factors unrelated to short selling may also affect a particular 
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offer’s stability and its success. 146  With this in mind, it may be preferable for 
regulators to seek to target any manipulative activity occurring through better 
enforcement of existing market abuse regimes rather than through imposing ex ante 
short sale restrictions. 
 
(c) Permanent Restrictions on Naked Short Sales 
Next, naked short sales are subject to a locate requirement under Regulation SHO. 
This was implemented in January 2005 and broker-dealers are required, prior to 
effecting a short sale in an equity security, (either for another person or for its own 
account), to locate securities available for borrowing. Broker-dealers are on the ‘front 
line’ with respect to short selling regulation and they must have either borrowed the 
security; entered into an arrangement to borrow the security; or have ‘reasonable 
grounds’ to believe the security can be borrowed so that it can be delivered on the 
date delivery is due.
147
 What constitutes reasonable grounds is not specified but a 
broker-dealer can receive assurance from a short seller that it can obtain the shares 
from another identifiable source in time to settle the trade.
148
 Further, the SEC has 
verified that easy to borrow lists can provide reasonable grounds provided the list is 
under 24 hours old and the securities on the list are readily available such that it 
would be unlikely a FTD would occur.
149
 Thus, in contrast to the EU provisions, the 
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reasonable grounds test can be satisfied without having to supply evidence of firm 
confirmations and arrangements ahead of settlement.
150
  
 
Regulation SHO also imposed additional delivery requirements on equity securities 
with substantial amounts of FTDs,
151
 however these provisions, and others, were then 
subsequently tightened in the light of the financial crisis. Indeed, particularly linked to 
the need for the SEC to be seen to be responding to the crisis,
152
 it embarked on a 
period of intensive rule making. For instance, between July 2008 and August 2009 the 
SEC took more than 15 regulatory actions with respect to short selling and many of 
these (related to its need to be perceived to be taking firm and decisive action) were 
adopted using emergency orders without the usual ‘public notice and comment’ 
process.
153
   
 
First, in the context of naked short sales, the SEC’s regulatory policy extended to 
encompass even tighter rules for FTDs. In particular, emergency FTD rules that were 
introduced by the SEC during the crisis were subsequently made permanent in July 
2009.
154
 These provisions required shares to be delivered for settlement by T+3, and, 
if the participant had a FTD, it had to be closed out by the morning after (T+4). If the 
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participant failed to close out the position it became subject to the pre-borrowing 
penalty.
155
 
 
Although the SEC’s move to eliminate FTDs was linked to a belief that FTDs had an 
effect on pricing efficiency and liquidity different from shares that deliver,
 156
 as 
observed in section C above, economically this is not the case. Specifically, the 
impact of a short sale on market quality does not depend on whether it results in 
timely delivery at settlement.
157
 In addition, the US already has processes in place to 
tackle any FTDs. For instance, the National Securities Clearing Corporation (the 
‘NSCC’) has a range of options for responding to FTDs including using shares in the 
selling member’s stock account, utilising its stock borrow program to cover the 
shortfall, as well as the initiation of buy-in procedures by the long member.
158
 
Further, while the position remains open, the seller will not receive the funds and the 
buyer can earn interest on the proceeds of the payment he retains until delivery.
159
 
Given that NSCC processes already exist to tackle settlement disruption, the SEC’s 
decision to remove the ability to fail can be queried, especially when ‘progressive 
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fines for settlement delay’ could arguably be as effective without constituting such an 
extreme solution.
160
  
 
During the crisis, the SEC also implemented a ‘naked short selling anti-fraud rule’, 
and subsequently adopted this permanently in October 2008.
161
 This rule was 
intended to further evidence the liability of short sellers who deceived specified 
persons (broadly, a broker-dealer; clearing agency participant, or a purchaser) about 
their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement.
162
 Nevertheless the 
requirement neither substantively amplified nor extended the existing rules on naked 
short selling or market manipulation and the need for the SEC to introduce it at all can 
again be questioned.
163
 
 
Essentially, the external political pressure that was placed on the SEC to tighten its 
regulatory restrictions on short selling played an important part with respect to the 
future direction of its policy.
164
 Indeed, as Sirri observes, with large scale regulatory 
reforms being negotiated on Capitol Hill, the SEC may not have wished to risk losing 
part of its authority over as transitory a matter as short selling, and pleasing 
Congressional critics ‘may have been an essential part of the SEC policy tradeoff’.165 
 
(d)  Concluding Remarks: EU and US Permanent Restrictions 
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Although the approach taken to permanent restrictions varies on both sides of the 
Atlantic, the result is functionally equivalent. The combination of the SEC’s locate 
rule plus its tighter FTD rules are functionally equivalent to the EU’s provisions: a de 
facto ban on naked short sales. Although this means regulators can eliminate any 
manipulative behaviour that does take place, it does so at the cost of market efficiency 
(and sophisticated market participants may also shift to unregulated equivalents). 
Indeed, rather than eliminating naked short sales, the US could instead consider 
tightening its settlement periods in line with the EU’s shift to T+2, in conjunction 
with the imposition of progressive penalties for FTDs. 
 
The US has also gone even further than the EU in this area with the imposition of 
restrictions on all short sales before SEOs. However, there are no restrictions on the 
short selling of sovereign debt in the US as no such crisis materialised there triggering 
a regulatory response as it did in the EU. Nevertheless, as this section has 
demonstrated, on both sides of the Atlantic, a range of political pressures impacted on 
the post-crisis rule-making process and had a significant influence on the 
policymakers’ approach to regulating short selling.  
 
E. Temporary Restrictions 
 
1. The EU 
 
As observed in section D.1(b), the EU rules also provide for a range of temporary 
powers that NCAs can utilise in emergency situations, including temporary short 
 42 
selling bans and ‘circuit breaker’ powers.166 Further, unlike the permanent restrictions 
that apply specifically to shares (and only relate to direct short sales), the temporary 
restrictions extend to cover direct and synthetic short sales (including those created 
through derivatives).
167
  
 
These additional powers are triggered when there are adverse events or developments 
constituting a serious threat to financial stability or to market confidence in the 
Member State or in one or more Member States, and the measure is necessary to 
address the threat and will not have a detrimental effect disproportionate to its 
benefits.
168
 The administrative rules set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken 
into account in this regard.
169
 Broadly, this includes any act, result, fact or event that 
is or could reasonably be expected to lead to serious financial, monetary, or budgetary 
problems that may lead to financial instability concerning a Member State, a bank, or 
systemically important financial institution operating within the EU when this may 
threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of 
the Union’s financial system. 170  Article 24(1)(b)-(e) provide further examples 
including (in brief): default by a Member State; substantial selling pressure causing 
significant downward spirals in financial instruments related to systemically 
important financial institutions; relevant damage to physical structures of important 
financial issuers and others; and relevant disruption in any payment system or 
settlement process. Various notification requirements are also placed on the NCA. It 
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is required to publish notice of a decision to impose or renew a measure on its 
website, providing details of the measures imposed.
171
 The NCA must also notify the 
other NCAs, and ESMA, who will issue a public opinion on whether it considers the 
measure appropriate.
172
 
 
(a) Overview  
A number of emergency measures have been imposed in Greece, Italy, and Spain 
since the Regulation’s introduction; two of which extended pre-existing national 
bans.
173
 Generally, ESMA has supported the imposition of these emergency measures, 
including the implementation and extension of a number of short selling bans by the 
Greek regulator (the Hellenic Republic Capital Market Commission (‘HCMC’)) when 
the Greek crisis reignited during 2015.
174
 ESMA’s positive opinions have tended to be 
relatively brief, largely reiterating the Regulation’s wording.175  
 
In January 2016 however, ESMA issued a more detailed negative opinion with 
respect to the proposed extension of an emergency short selling ban by the Greek 
regulator regarding the shares of Attica Bank S.A.
176
 Specifically, ESMA considered 
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that the threat to financial stability of Attica bank and the Greek financial market had 
‘considerably decreased’, and took the view that renewing the measure was neither 
appropriate nor proportionate.
177
 Despite ESMA’s opinion however, the Greek 
authorities disagreed, and imposed the ban for a further two-week period.
178
 HCMC 
stated that Attica Bank was the last of the Greek banks to be recapitalised and that it 
should be protected from short selling in the same manner as the other Greek credit 
institutions.
179
  
 
This is the first time since the Regulation was implemented that ESMA has opposed a 
NCA’s proposed emergency measure. ESMA provided quantitative analysis of Attica 
Bank’s share price and concluded that its pricing history did not give the impression 
of a highly fragile situation.
180
 It also highlighted that Attica Bank’s situation was 
different to the other Greek banks; in terms of quantitative significance with respect to 
financial stability, Attica Bank stood for only a very small segment of the Greek 
banking sector.
181
 ESMA also noted the presence of alternative tools under the 
Regulation (including the circuit breaker powers) that could be utilised as a more 
appropriate and proportionate short-term measure if there was a significant downward 
spiral in the price of the shares.
182
 
 
It is likely that the wider political context and the fragility of Greek relations within 
the EU played a key part in driving HCMC’s decision to extend its short selling ban. 
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More broadly however, it is also likely that this will not be the only situation where a 
NCA and ESMA disagree as to the imposition of an emergency short selling measure. 
With this in mind, it still remains to be seen how much authority ESMA will seek to 
exert in practice going forward, especially in the event there is a difference of views, 
and where a coordinated response by NCAs across the EU is necessary.
183
 
 
(b) Impact of the Emergency Bans  
With respect to the economic impact of the emergency bans in practice, their effect 
has been largely mixed. For instance, in relation to the Spanish emergency ban, 
market participants observed reduced liquidity, and suggested that the bans distorted 
the fair value of securities by removing a large set of market participants.
184
 A high 
level of uncertainty also existed concerning the scope of the Spanish ban, including 
whether it encompassed index-linked instruments such as derivatives referenced to 
global or pan-European indices, which included one or more of the shares subject to 
the measure.
185
 
 
As was explored in section C, there is no conclusive evidence that taking short 
positions is harmful to the financial system or market confidence, and imposing 
restrictions may result in a loss of pricing efficiency and liquidity. Despite this, it is 
also recognised that viewpoints differ on this, and that this is also part of a more 
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complex story of the social benefits and harms that result from short selling.
186
 
Nevertheless, it also remains clear that the benefits of imposing temporary bans have 
to be very carefully weighed against the longer-term and more subtle benefits that 
short selling provides and that this decision will ultimately involve a trade-off 
between financial stability and market efficiency.
187
 Further, given that restrictions do 
not necessarily achieve their desired aim, it is hard to see what is actually gained 
(aside from in a political sense) through their imposition.
188
 Finally, it could also be 
questioned whether introducing such measures are in fact ‘necessary’ and will not 
have a detrimental effect disproportional to its benefits.
189
  
 
Reflecting on the more procedural aspects of the bans, market participants are 
currently required to check all NCA’s websites and there is no requirement to publish 
information in a common language. Given the urgency inherent in imposing a 
temporary measure, it is vital that information is communicated to parties in a timely 
fashion, and this is not the case when reliance is placed on participants checking 28 
NCA websites, plus the absence of a requirement for notification in a common 
language.
190
 In practice there has also been a lack of coordination between NCAs 
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when a ban has been imposed on an issuer’s securities traded on several European 
venues. This has created uncertainty as to which instruments trading on what venues 
are within the scope of the restriction and has imposed unnecessary costs on 
commercial parties.
191
 Long and short trading of certain instruments outside the scope 
of the emergency measures has been affected during the period before participants 
reached absolute certainty in having their concerns addressed that the instrument may 
be within the measure’s scope and this had immediate negative effects on price 
efficiency, liquidity and investment in such instruments.
192
 
 
Although the European rules seek to avoid the go-it-alone strategies that dominated 
the financial crisis through allocating a relevant NCA in conjunction with notification 
requirements to other NCAs and ESMA, a lack of coordination remains. Although 
ESMA has an important oversight role, in the absence of utilising article 28 and 
intervening itself, it has no real authority to prevent NCAs from implementing 
incoherent approaches.
193
 Given the importance of a consistent approach in the event 
that short selling restrictions are to be imposed (if the rules are to have any impact), it 
may be seem sensible, although controversial, to also transfer these powers to ESMA. 
On a more practical note, to reduce communication issues in practice, it would be 
useful to introduce a single platform or website to transmit information and require all 
communications to be in a common language or translated into all necessary 
languages. 
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(c)  Circuit Breakers 
The Regulation also provides for a circuit breaker mechanism: the power to 
temporarily restrict short selling of financial instruments on trading venues in the case 
of a significant fall in price during a single trading day in relation to the closing price 
on the previous day.
194
 The NCA of the home Member State for that venue will 
consider whether it is appropriate to prohibit or restrict short selling of that instrument 
or otherwise limit transactions to prevent a disorderly decline in the price.
195
 In 
contrast to the temporary prohibitions, this mechanism is not subject to the ‘adverse 
event that constitutes a threat to financial stability’ condition. Rather, the Regulation 
provides that the intra-day fall in value that triggers consideration as to whether to 
exercise the powers shall be 10 per cent or more for liquid shares.
196
 The initial 
prohibition shall apply for a period not exceeding the end of the trading day following 
the trading day on which the price fall occurs. This can be extended for a further 
period not exceeding two further trading days if there is a further significant fall of at 
least half the amount specified (for example, for liquid shares this will be a further 
five per cent).
197
 
 
The NCA must again publish notice of any decision to impose or renew such 
measures on its website and notify the other NCAs and ESMA. ESMA is less 
involved with this power due to the urgency inherent in the circuit breaker measure 
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but ESMA shall immediately inform the NCAs of the home Member States of venues 
that trade the same instrument.
198
 
 
(d)  Circuit Breakers in Practice 
A number of temporary prohibitions have been imposed since the Regulation’s 
implementation. For instance in January and April 2013, seven temporary bans were 
imposed by the Italian regulator, CONSOB on Italian shares trading on the Milan 
stock exchange. Equally, in July 2013, Portugal imposed a one-day short selling ban 
on the shares of four companies. Short selling in one of these Portuguese firms (a 
bank) was also temporarily restricted again in July 2014.
199
 In some instances, their 
imposition has been followed by other NCAs who considered it useful to also impose 
a ban on platforms where the shares were traded.  
 
Due to the various notifications required, the restrictions have been imposed with a 
non-trivial delay. For instance, the regulator announced the Portuguese ban several 
hours before it would take effect. Likewise, in relation to the Italian restrictions, there 
was a non-trivial delay between the threshold being crossed and CONSOB 
announcing the ban. Such gaps limit a measure’s effectiveness as they can enable 
shrewd traders who act quickly to trade ahead of a ban’s imposition. Similarly, by the 
time the Italian restrictions were announced, prices had already stabilised or 
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rebounded and transaction volumes were starting to normalise.
200
 A further problem 
has stemmed from the overlap of automatic trading interruption mechanisms on 
trading venues (‘automatic circuit breakers’), which also begs the question whether 
additional circuit breakers were necessary in the first place. Further, due to 
uncertainty relating to decisions at other venues to introduce restrictions or take no 
action, market participants may have stopped all short shares on trading venues. 
Alternatively if they chose to proceed with short sales at other venues, they retained 
the possibility to arbitrage with prices on the home venue.
201
 
 
Considering the Italian bans, there have also been implementation inconsistencies 
between NCAs. For instance a CONSOB ban with respect to the Italian firm Saipem 
was implemented for one and a half days whereas the UK’s FSA imposed it for only 
one day. Equally, the Italian ban allowed for a market-making exemption whereas the 
UK measure did not. The individual bans were also released to the market and on 
each NCA’s website at different times during the trading day. There have also been 
criticisms concerning procedure including the short time frame for decision-making; 
the lack of information published on the NCA’s website; and the method for 
publication and communication.
202
  Likewise, the thresholds are too low: 10 per cent 
may be far too small a drop to contemplate a ban on a liquid share in most 
circumstances.
203
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Similar criticisms have been levied at the circuit breakers as with the longer bans 
including the ineffectiveness of measures imposed by only one regulator. The related 
uncertainty as to which instruments are included has led to market confusion and 
imposed extra investigative costs on parties. Given that trading venues typically have 
automatic circuit breakers that could interrupt trading if necessary, the new 
requirements seem superfluous and create extra implementation issues. Indeed, with 
some of these issues in mind, ESMA proposed reworking the provisions, including in 
order to make the process more straightforward and to allow a NCA to exercise its 
judgment as to if and when a temporary measure was necessary.
204
 Nevertheless the 
Commission opted against making any changes and proposed a new evaluation by the 
end of 2016 when more extensive empirical data and evidence would be available.
205
 
More generally, it is suggested that the regulator should not be in the habit of simply 
stopping price declines; the market should be able to price in disaster. In most cases it 
is not short selling that gives rise to a price fall but other factors such as poor 
company results and economic fundamentals.  
 
(e) ESMA’s Powers 
Aside from its coordination role, ESMA has a number of other powers (including the 
ability to conduct inquiries and coordinate on-site inspections with cross-border 
effects). Most notably however, it is also granted direct intervention powers under 
article 28 of the Regulation, and the political decision to confer these powers on 
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ESMA was taken before the Regulation’s adoption during the broader negotiations for 
the founding regulations creating ESMA and the other European Supervisory 
Authorities.
206
   
 
Article 28 enables ESMA to prohibit or impose conditions on the entry into short 
sales or equivalent transactions in exceptional circumstances (sovereign debt is 
excluded from this power).
207
 ESMA can use its direct powers to address a threat to 
the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole 
or part of the EU’s financial system, there are cross-border implications, and no NCA 
has taken measures to address the threat, or one or more authorities have taken 
measures that do not adequately address the threat.
208
 The administrative measures 
elaborate on what constitutes exceptional circumstances and the provisions are similar 
to the conditions required for NCA emergency action.
209
 When taking such measures, 
ESMA shall also take account of the extent the measure significantly addresses the 
threat or improves the NCA’s ability to monitor the threat, does not create a risk of 
regulatory arbitrage, and does not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of 
financial markets.
210
 A range of procedural requirements are also placed on ESMA, 
including prior consultation with the European Systemic Risk Board (a post-crisis 
Union level body with a mandate to oversee risk in the overall financial system) and 
prior notifications to the NCAs concerned by the measure.
211
 ESMA is required to 
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publish notice of the decision on its website and any measure will prevail over 
previous measures taken by a NCA.
212
  
 
The conferral of the article 28 powers on ESMA considerably expands its authority 
beyond that granted to its predecessor, CESR, and marks a significant step forward 
with respect to EU intervention in markets. ESMA is placed at the centre of important 
and delicate decisions with respect to short selling, and it could, potentially, be in a 
position to exert much influence going forward.
213
 With this in mind, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that ESMA’s article 28 powers were the subject of a legal challenge by 
the UK in 2012 at the European Court of Justice (the ‘Court’). The UK challenged 
ESMA’s powers on a number of grounds, including that ESMA had been granted a 
large measure of discretion at odds with European principles on the delegation of 
powers; and submitting that article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(‘TFEU’) was the incorrect legal basis for the adoption of article 28. 214 Nevertheless, 
although the Advocate General supported the UK with respect to its article 114 TFEU 
submission, in January 2014, the Court rejected the UK’s challenge. It affirmed 
ESMA’s powers of intervention, as well as the legislative choice of legal basis for the 
adoption of article 28.
215
  
 
                                                 
212
 Ibid art 28(11). 
213
 Moloney, ‘Reform or Revolution? The Financial Crisis, EU Financial Markets Law, and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority’ (n 53) 532. Note that this shift to centralise powers in 
ESMA is also evident in other post-crisis initiatives, including AIFMD and EMIR. 
214
 For a detailed discussion of this case, see e.g. Carl Fredrik Bergström, ‘Shaping the New System for 
Delegation of Powers to EU Agencies: United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council (Short 
Selling)’ (2015) 52 CML Rev 219; Noia and Gargantini (n 4); Elizabeth Howell, ‘The European Court 
of Justice: Selling Us Short?’ (2014) 11 ECFR 454. 
215
 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v Council of the European Union and European Parliament 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, paras 112, 114-115. 
 54 
Despite the renewed turmoil in the financial markets recently, ESMA has not yet 
resorted to its article 28 powers in practice and so it still remains to be seen how it 
will use its new direct powers. Nevertheless, as Moloney suggests, notwithstanding 
the Court’s confirmation of ESMA’s powers of intervention, given the various 
political sensitivities surrounding article 28, it may be that ESMA chooses to be 
relatively circumspect before utilising its direct powers.
216
  
 
2. The US: Temporary Restrictions 
 
(a) Original Price Test 
Across the Atlantic, historically, the SEC restricted short selling using what was 
commonly referred to as the ‘uptick rule’. This was implemented in 1938 and 
essentially required that before a security could be sold short the price had to rise, 
indicating there were active buyers in the market.
217
 Despite many changes in the 
securities market, including the conversion to decimal pricing increments, increased 
trading volumes and the advent of electronic trading, the main provisions remained 
virtually unchanged until its repeal in 2007.
218
 Empirical studies (including a multi-
year pilot conducted by the SEC) also demonstrated that the rule hindered short 
selling’s efficiency aspects, did not halt price declines, and could have an adverse 
effect on the execution quality of short sale orders, even when they traded in 
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advancing markets.
219
 After a process involving the pilot, other empirical studies, plus 
opportunities for public comment, the SEC voted to remove the rule. 
 
At the time this news caused little public notice, however once the crisis took hold the 
SEC faced increasing criticism for its decision. The pressure in fact mounted to the 
point that the rule’s repeal was described as a breach of public trust and grounds for 
the SEC Chairman’s dismissal.220 Although the SEC explicitly stated it was not aware 
of economic evidence that the elimination of the price test contributed to increased 
volatility in the US markets, the SEC started to meet with many demands to reinstate 
a price test, and in February 2010 it introduced ‘alternative uptick rule’: a variant on 
the original test.
221
  
 
(b) The Alternative Uptick Rule 
The new rule consists of a circuit breaker combined with an alternative uptick rule. 
Trading centres are to have policies in place to prevent the execution or display or a 
short sale order of a security at a price less than or equal to the national best bid if the 
price of the security decreases by 10 per cent or more from the closing price as 
determined by the listing market for the security as of the end of regular trading hours 
on the previous day.
222
 The requirements are then imposed for the remainder of the 
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day and the following day and if the price continues to fall so the circuit breaker is re-
triggered, the restriction period will restart. It applies to all national market system 
(‘NMS’) stocks (i.e. any NMS security other than options) listed on a national 
securities exchange.
223
 Broadly, this means it applies to all equity securities listed on a 
national securities exchange whether traded on exchange or OTC. The restrictions 
apply only at such times as the national best bid for the security is calculated and 
disseminated on a current and continuing basis by a plan processor pursuant to a NMS 
plan.
224
 It does not extend to derivative securities and there are only very limited 
exemptions from the rule (for instance the SEC decided not to provide an exemption 
for bona fide market-making activity). 
 
The SEC stated that its aims were to prevent short selling from driving down the price 
of a security that had experienced a 10 per cent decline and to allow long sellers to 
stand at the front of the line and sell first in a declining market.
225
 The SEC also 
particularly focused on the rule’s ability to restore ‘investor confidence’. Specifically, 
the SEC Chairman (Mary Schapiro) stated it was a rule designed to preserve investor 
confidence and promote market efficiency.
226
 
 
The SEC’s arguments in relation to introducing the new rule are un-compelling. There 
is no empirical evidence that the uptick rule’s repeal contributed to steep declines in 
stocks and increased volatility, and there is no evidence questioning the efficacy of 
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the pilot studies supporting its repeal.
227
 The vague concept of investor confidence 
also affords the SEC too much discretion to regulate and more is necessary to justify 
restricting short selling, especially in the light of evidence that advised against 
imposing such a test.
228
 The SEC’s adopting release also repeatedly relies on the 
circuit breaker feature to discount the risk that the rule would adversely affect market 
quality. This does not mean a price test is then merited.
229
 Indeed, on a related point 
concerning the circuit breaker, and in line with the observations in relation to the EU, 
the 10 per cent threshold seems disproportionate: it is doubtful this reflects a situation 
of severe deterioration and the market will also factor in its existence.
230
 
 
Further, restricting short selling to allow long sellers to sell first may mean investors 
are less likely to buy shares when constraints increase the cost of hedging.
231
 
Likewise, short selling constraints can lead to inflated prices as short sellers’ views 
will not be fully integrated into the market and this could lead to investors being less 
willing to go long or to insist on paying less when purchasing shares.
232
 On a related 
point, the rule’s adoption suggests that short selling is viewed as being less legitimate 
than long selling. This is a common popular perception but as this article has 
illustrated, short sellers provide a valuable role in markets, including preventing 
prices from being artificially inflated. Further, during the financial crisis, it was long 
                                                 
227
 SEC, ‘Amendments to Regulation SHO, Release No. 34-61595 (Final Rule)’ (n 223) 34, 39; 
Kathleen Casey, ‘Speech by SEC Commissioner: Statement at Open Meeting Short-­Sale Restrictions’ 
(24 February 2010) 1-2. 
228
 This included studies by the SEC’s own Office of Economic Analysis, see Troy Paredes, ‘Speech by 
SEC Commissioner: Statement at Open Meeting and Dissent Regarding the Adoption of Amendments 
to Regulation SHO’ (24 February 2010) 6. 
229
 Ibid 8. 
230
 Grunewald, Wagner and Weber (n 45) 124. 
231
 Paredes (n 228) 7. 
232
 Ibid 7. 
 58 
rather than short sellers that particularly contributed to the price pressure on financial 
stocks and the extreme negative returns.
233
 
 
Ultimately the strongest case for adopting the rule is that it ‘may mollify those who 
have been clamouring for reinstatement of the uptick rule and show that we have 
responded to their concerns’.234 This is not the standard by which to craft rules and 
the SEC should resist the urge to act merely to say it had acted. Nevertheless, when 
reflecting on the EU in comparison however, at least it chose not to follow the SEC in 
relation to this branch of its regulatory policy.
235
  
 
(c) EU and US Temporary Rules: Concluding Remarks 
From examining the European and US rules, it becomes clear that the Regulation’s 
temporary constraints can potentially have a wider ambit than those in place in the 
US; the rules can extend to encompass any financial instrument that creates a short 
position. In contrast, the US’s alternative uptick rule does not have such a broad 
application, applying only to equity securities and not extending to synthetic 
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equivalents.
236
 As this section has illustrated however, the US has gone further than 
the EU in this area of its policy through re-imposing a type of price test.  
 
Divergences in regulatory response between the jurisdictions may create extra costs 
and difficulties for market participants.
237
 Further, the absence of a co-ordinated, 
global response can enable sophisticated traders to work around the rules relatively 
easily through engaging in regulatory arbitrage.
238
  Although this could be perceived 
to be a welcome outcome given the drawbacks associated with short selling 
restrictions, it is suggested that this is not the right solution. It undermines the 
attempts at regulation and new problems may materialise, not least due to the 
uncertainties created through the presence of different regimes.
239
  
 
Indeed, such issues have already been observed within the EU’s regime in practice; 
the lack of ‘joined up thinking’ between the NCAs when temporary restrictions have 
been imposed has caused uncertainty and imposed additional costs on commercial 
parties. Further, although ESMA’s enhanced role within the EU’s short selling regime 
is a significant development (and its recent negative opinion on the proposed 
extension of Greek temporary ban is notable in this regard), it still remains to be seen 
how assertive ESMA will be in utilising its authority in a future crisis, especially 
when a coordinated NCA response is required. In the US, the SEC is the sole short 
selling regulator and should, in theory, avoid the operational difficulties observable 
                                                 
236
 Although beyond the scope of the article, it is acknowledged that this could be in part due to 
jurisdictional boundaries that exist between the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(the ‘CFTC’). 
237
 Payne (n 9) 428. 
238
 It is acknowledged however that the likelihood of achieving global short selling rules may be 
unrealistic, especially in the post-crisis era where arguments against seeking uniformity with respect to 
international rule-making have gained much impetus.  
239
 Moloney (n 2) 20. 
 60 
within the EU. Nevertheless, the SEC has had to respond to other political and 
popular pressures post-crisis, and it has had to switch its focus from ensuring market 
efficiency in order to react to concerns related to maintaining financial stability.
240
  
F. Conclusion 
 
To revisit first principles, it is important to remember that the economic literature 
almost overwhelmingly endorses the importance of conventional and naked short 
selling for efficient markets; and that restricting short selling prevents markets being 
more efficient. Indeed, despite the fixation with naked short selling, and the 
fundamental distinction drawn between naked and covered short selling in the EU and 
the US, it is not a special case and there are not stronger justifications for its 
regulation. Despite this, and although not terming it as such, both the US and the EU 
have now implemented a de facto ban on the naked short selling of shares. Further, 
although functional similarities are now apparent between the two regimes with 
respect to naked short selling, a number of other regulatory differences remain. 
Indeed, in this regard, the introduction of the EU short selling rules that include 
restrictions with respect to the sovereign debt markets, do little to ‘close the gap’.241  
 
Next, in both jurisdictions, the politicisation of the legislative process had a major 
impact on the shape of the final rules. In the EU, this is most clearly reflected in the 
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rules on sovereign debt, further articulated through the absence of equivalent rules on 
corporate bonds. In the US, it can be observed especially through the re-
implementation of a type of tick test.  Indeed, when reflecting on the short selling 
constraints that are in place, it is the US that now has the more onerous set of 
restrictions, and this outcome can perhaps be best explained by the SEC being directly 
‘under the cosh’ of Congress, post-crisis.  
 
Returning to the big picture, as this article observed at its outset, short selling is a 
controversial topic, and the issue of its regulation tends to generate more heat than 
light.
242
 Views have differed on it since the 17
th
 Century,
243
 and the debate continues 
today when many continue to feel that the practice is morally wrong. Short sellers 
have a tendency to be blamed during major crises, and the backlash that follows such 
an event then creates the opportunity to push through reforms that have little true 
connection with the crisis.
244
 Post-crisis developments in both the EU and the US 
appear to support this suggestion,
245
 and perhaps, with the short selling restrictions 
now in place on both sides of the Atlantic, it is the politicians, rather than the 
speculators, who have sold us short. 
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